This rule prevails in the courts of some of the eastern states,5 but in most of the states the privilege has been denied by statute.
In charging the jury, the trial judge, not being limited to instructions of an abstract sort, can express his opinion in strong terms.' The privilege of com- menting on the evidence, however, has its limitations inherent in and implied from the very nature of the judicial office. The comments should not be in the nature of an argument; rather they should be a fair and dispassionate statement of what the evidence showed and a tempered expression of his opinion as to the facts.7 To assume the r6le of an advocate rather than an impartial judge is error as established by repeated decisions. 8 The judge, however has been permitted to stress "the importance of the case because of the letting 'down of the bars' protecting property rights and the lowering of the standards of honesty"9 provided that the duty of law enforcement was coupled with the duty of seeing that no innocent man was convicted.
It is important that hostile comment of the judge should not render vain the privilege of the accused to testify in his own behalf."' The court cannot use such language in his charge to the jury that he leaves with them the impression that they will be held up to ridicule, or be deceived if they render a verdict contrary to the views expressed in the charge."
The comments upon the evidence must be limited to facts which have actually been brought out by evidence in the case and not to a conjectural state of facts of which no evidence has been offered. 2 The Supreme Court seemed to believe the principal case fell within this objection, the trial judge having added to the evidence by commenting upon the defendant's demeanor while testifying.
This view of the court would infer that the defendant's demeanor while on the stand was not evidence. The authorities contradict any such inference. The cases uniformly sanction the proposition that the jury may properly take into consideration the demeanor of the witness in determining his credibility.3 If the refused jury's request to be discharged on failing to agree saying that he regarded the testimony as convincing. jury may consider the demeanor of the witness, it would seem to be a variety of real evidence and to be the proper subject of comment by the judge. If the judge added to the evidence it was by his statement that certain behavior was nearly always an indication of lying. The significance of nervous behavior is a matter of experience as to which the jury should have been left free to form their own judgment. The positive and unqualified statement by the judge apparently foreclosed the matter.'4 Since the witness's demeanor upon the stand is to be observed and taken into consideration by the jury it is a part of the evidence, and so it is within the province of the trial judge to comment upon this particular evidence as well as any other type of evidence and subject only to the same limitations. For these reasons it seems the Supreme Court stated the rule too broadly and the trial judge's comment did not add to the evidence, though it may have exceeded the bounds of fair comment in being highly prejudicial.
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ANALYSIS OF "APPARENT AUTHORITY" IN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
In the recent case of Berryhill v. Ellett, plaintiff bought a policy from the defendant insurance company through Ellett, the district agent. The policy stated that the district agent should collect only the first premium, the other premiums being payable only at the home office or to an "authorized" agent upon delivery of a receipt signed in a specified way. Despite the fact the general agent had refused upon plaintiff's request to allow a discount on premiums paid in advance, plaintiff nevertheless began paying his premiums in advance to Ellett. The latter allowed plaintiff discounts on the 1927, 1930, and 1931 premiums, which were not paid directly to the specified agents of the company as required by the wording of the policy. The general agent and the home office had no knowledge of these transactions. When Ellett was unable to perform his agreement with plaintiff by paying the premiums to the company as they fell due, the plaintiff brought an action against the company, the general agent, and Ellett, alleging "that the insurance company .... by their acts, conduct, and generals or particulars, their directness or evasiveness, are soon detected .... The appearance and manner, the voice, the gestures, the readiness and promptness of the answers, the evasions, the reluctance, the silence, the contumacious silence, the contradictions, the explanations, the intelligence or the want of intelligence of the witness, the passions which move or control-fear, love, hate, envy, or revenge-are all open to observation, noted, and weighed by the jury." Chief Justice Appleton, Evidence (186o), 220.
"There is, however, a secondary advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness; the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness." 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923 (1933) .
